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Vision affords us with the ability to consciously see, and use this information in our 
behavior. While research has produced a detailed account of the function of the visual 
system, the neural processes that underlie conscious vision are still debated. One of the 
aims of the present thesis was to examine the time-course of the neuroelectrical 
processes that correlate with conscious vision. The second aim was to study the neural 
basis of unconscious vision, that is, situations where a stimulus that is not consciously 
perceived nevertheless influences behavior. 
According to current prevalent models of conscious vision, the activation of visual 
cortical areas is not, as such, sufficient for consciousness to emerge, although it might be 
sufficient for unconscious vision. Conscious vision is assumed to require reciprocal 
communication between cortical areas, but views differ substantially on the extent of 
this recurrent communication. Visual consciousness has been proposed to emerge from 
recurrent neural interactions within the visual system, while other models claim that 
more widespread cortical activation is needed for consciousness.  
Studies I-III compared models of conscious vision by studying event-related potentials 
(ERP). ERPs represent the brain’s average electrical response to stimulation. The results 
support the model that associates conscious vision with activity localized in the ventral 
visual cortex. The timing of this activity corresponds to an intermediate stage in visual 
processing. Earlier stages of visual processing may influence what becomes conscious, 
although these processes do not directly enable visual consciousness. Late processing 
stages, when more widespread cortical areas are activated, reflect the access to and 
manipulation of contents of consciousness. 
Studies IV and V concentrated on unconscious vision. By using transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) we show that when early visual cortical processing is disturbed so 
that subjects fail to consciously perceive visual stimuli, they may nevertheless guess 
(above chance-level) the location where the visual stimuli were presented. However, 
the results also suggest that in a similar situation, early visual cortex is necessary for 
both conscious and unconscious perception of chromatic information (i.e. color). 
Chromatic information that remains unconscious may influence behavioral responses 







early stimulus-driven (feedforward) activation may be sufficient for unconscious 
processing. 
In conclusion, the results of this thesis support the view that conscious vision is enabled 
by a series of processing stages. The processes that most closely correlate with 
conscious vision take place in the ventral visual cortex ~200 ms after stimulus 
presentation, although preceding time-periods and contributions from other cortical 
areas such as the parietal cortex are also indispensable. Unconscious vision relies on 
intact early visual activation, although the location of visual stimulus may be 
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One of the most remarkable facts about brain is that it provides us with the ability to 
consciously perceive the environment. Conscious perception is intimately linked with 
our ability to function in the world, but also unconscious processing of visual 
information can guide behavior (Milner & Goodale, 2006). As an example, take the well-
known phenomenon called blindsight: despite being blind in parts of the visual system 
due to damaged primary visual cortex, these patients can make accurate judgments 
about the visual stimuli they claim they cannot (consciously) see. The cortical damage 
interferes with the patient’s ability to consciously see, but nevertheless the brain has 
somehow gained knowledge of these stimuli, and can use it to influence behavior. What 
are the neural processes that correlate with, and perhaps enable, conscious visual 
perception? How can visual information that is not consciously experienced 
nevertheless influence behavior?  
The studies of this thesis examined the timing of the processes that underlie vision. First, 
using event-related potentials (ERP) we examined the timing and rough localization of 
the neuroelectrical processes that correlate with conscious visual perception (Studies I–
III). Second, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we studied which neural 
mechanisms are necessary for conscious and unconscious vision, concentrating on early 
levels of cortical processing (Studies IV–V). Each empirical study of the thesis employed 








1.1. Consciousness research 
1.1.1. Psychological and philosophical basis 
As you read these words, your eyes convey visual information to your brain, whose 
neural networks then extract the words and their meaning. But how can this 
information processed in neural networks be available to consciousness? This question 
has its roots in the classical philosophical mind–body problem, according to which 
subjective mental contents seem to be fundamentally different from the material world.  
The central defining feature of consciousness (or awareness, which I will use as a 
synonym of consciousness) is the presence of subjective experiences (Nagel, 1974). 
Philosophers use the term qualia to refer to the qualitative features of conscious 
experience. For example, the subjective phenomenal feel of red color — how it appears 
to you — is a quale. Quantitative descriptions, no matter how detailed, can never fully 
capture, for instance, why light whose wavelength is ~700 nm, causes experiential 
contents with the qualia of redness. Why should any physical process give rise to any 
experience? This is what Chalmers (1996) has called the hard problem of consciousness 
research.  
Conscious experience was considered a central theme in the early days of psychological 
science (James, 1892/2001; Titchener, 1928), but then deemed to be beyond the reach 
of science by the school of behaviorism (Watson, 1913). Cognitive science rekindled the 
interest in studying the mind, but the investigations went on largely without making 
references to consciousness, until the issue surfaced in the late 1980’s in cognitive 







Although the hard problem of consciousness at present seems to be beyond the grasp of 
science, empirical facts nevertheless demonstrate that the brain is crucial for 
consciousness. Damage the brain and you are also likely to damage the mind, and 
consciousness. What neural mechanisms, then, are crucial for consciousness? Why do 
blindsight patients lose conscious vision but retain the ability to use the visual 
information from the blind part of their visual field in their behavior? What is the 
difference between conscious and unconscious vision in terms of neural processes 
involved?  
The current aim of the neuroscientific study of consciousness is to find the neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCC) (Crick & Koch, 1990). Is the activity of specific kinds 
of neurons sufficient for visual experience? Is some specific interaction between 
neurons required to form conscious vision? Do unconscious and conscious modes of 
processing depend on different neural pathways? The objective is to find out the 
“minimal neuronal mechanisms jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept” 
(Crick & Koch, 2003, p. 119). Although finding the NCC will not solve the hard problem, 
together with theories of neural mechanisms of consciousness, it will increase our 









1.1.2. Defining consciousness 
The concept “consciousness” is typically assumed to refer to several distinct, but closely 
related phenomena (Block, 1995; Chalmers, 2000). One basic division is between state 
of consciousness and contents of consciousness. A subject is in a conscious state when 
she has any subjective experiences, but subjects who are in a conscious state can vary in 
the level of arousal or wakefulness (Laureys, 2005). Metaphorically, a conscious state 
can be viewed as a medium which can hold a range of different contents of 
consciousness (e.g. conscious visual experiences).  
The present thesis is about conscious and unconscious visual processing. I will use 
“visual consciousness” to refer to visual contents of consciousness. Arguably, the most 
basic form of visual consciousness consists of visual qualia; fleeting, subjective visual 
experiences. This type of consciousness has been termed phenomenal consciousness 
(Block, 1995). When the contents of phenomenal consciousness are accessed, selected 
as contents of working memory so that they can be manipulated and reflected upon, 
reflective consciousness emerges (Revonsuo, 2006; this has also been termed “access” 
consciousness; Block, 1995; Lamme, 2003). Naming and reporting the contents of 
phenomenal consciousness is the function of reflective consciousness, whereas 
phenomenal consciousness refers to experience per se. Other researchers have denied 
the possibility of pure phenomenal consciousness, and argue that all consciousness is 
necessarily reflective: Sensory representations cannot enter consciousness unless they 
are selected into working memory by attention (Dehaene, et al., 2006), or unless they 







views of what consciousness consists of are also reflected in the theories about the 
neural basis of conscious perception, as the phenomenal-reflective distinction implies 
that they also have different neural correlates.  
 
1.1.3. Measuring consciousness  
Consciousness is notoriously hard to measure due to its private character. One solution 
is to examine participants’ “objective” performance; for example, accuracy in 
recognizing a visual stimulus (e.g. van Aalderen-Smeets, et al., 2006). The problem of 
this objective approach is that it does not directly assess consciousness. A stimulus 
might, for example, be consciously perceived, but distorted, and hence hard to identify.  
Similarly, even stimuli that remain unconscious may guide a participant’s behavior, 
enabling them to perform above chance-level (Cowey, 2010). This is why “forced-choice” 
response paradigms, where the participants are required to make a choice between 
different response alternatives (even when they did not consciously see the target), are 
often employed to study unconscious perception. 
Arguably, when the aim is to study whether or not a participant saw a stimulus, the 
most direct way is to ask the participant to report her subjective percepts. The report 
could be a dichotomous “Yes, I did see”/“No, I did not see” button press decision (e.g. 
Boyer, et al., 2005), but this type of categorization is insensitive to small but possibly 
significant differences in conscious perception. Hence, the use of continuous (Sergent & 







Overgaard, 2004). The advantage of using an ordinal scale with few alternatives is that 
it is intuitive and each alternative can be precisely described and characterized 
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard, et al., 2006). Other methods to measure 
consciousness include asking participants to rate their confidence concerning a decision, 
or ask them to wager after they have made a task-related decision (Dienes & Seth, 2010). 
Trying to demonstrate that a stimulus remained unconscious is similarly challenging. 
How to know that a participant did not see a stimulus at all, not even for a very brief 
glimpse? For the reasons cited above, a Likert-scale with a few alternatives is often the 
most useful (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard, 2011). It should be noted, however, 
that subjective ratings always require the participants to employ some decision 
criterion. For example, in order to judge whether a stimulus was “not seen at all”, or 
“barely seen”, the participants use some criterion to determine which alternative to 
select.  Therefore participants who employ a loose criterion might falsely report “not 
seeing a stimulus at all” when in fact they might have had some conscious percept of the 
stimuli. To some extent, this problem can be handled by giving the participants 
sufficiently many alternatives (i.e. to use a high-resolution scale).  
 
1.1.4. Manipulating consciousness and studying its neural correlates 
In order to study consciousness experimentally, it must somehow be manipulated. 
There are multiple different methods for manipulating visual consciousness (Kim & 







and TMS. As discussed later in detail, in metacontrast masking a visual “mask stimulus” 
prevents the conscious perception of another, preceding visual stimulus. In TMS the 
same is accomplished by directly interfering with neural activity in cortex by electric-
fields induced by magnetic pulses. One crucial question is what causes the suppression 
of conscious visual perception as this tells us what processes are necessary for 
conscious perception. A further question is does the suppression of conscious vision 
also suppresses unconscious perception? This kind of analysis might shed light on what 
neural mechanisms underlie unconscious perception, and what are the crucial 
differences between unconscious and conscious processes.  
Comparison of brain activity of situations that differ with respect to contents of 
consciousness, but are almost or completely identical with respect to physical 
stimulation, allow the investigation of the NCC. That is, if in one situation a visual 
stimulus is consciously seen, but in another condition the same stimulus remains 
outside consciousness (although the same stimulus is presented), then the neural 
processes that are associated with conscious perception should only be present in the 
former condition. Comparison of brain activity in the two conditions should thus reveal 
the NCC of that type of visual experience. Nevertheless, all processes that correlate with 
conscious perception might not be those that directly enable visual experience. For 
example, selective attention might influence what sensory representations become 
conscious (Lamme, 2004), and cognitive manipulation of the contents of consciousness 
(i.e. reflective consciousness; Block, 1995) might show up as a NCC, but these processes 
might not be sufficient for conscious experience to emerge. In summary, the comparison 







perceived will reveal a causal chain of processes of which only a subset might directly 
correspond to the neural events that enable visual experience (Aru et al., 2012).  
 
1.2. Theories and findings about the neural correlates of consciousness 
1.2.1. Cortical areas involved in conscious vision 
Conscious vision is largely dependent on the cortical areas that analyze visual 
information. Damage to V1 produces blindness in the visual field locations that 
correspond to the damaged neural tissue (e.g. damage to left V1 leads to blindness in 
the right visual field; Holmes, 1918). Lesions to specific higher-order visual areas 
produce more limited deficits in visual perception. Damage to ventral cortical area 
labeled V4, for instance, results in an inability to consciously see colors (achromatopsia) 
(Heywood & Cowey, 1999).  
Lesions outside classical sensory visual areas may also produce deficits in conscious 
vision. Hemispatial neglect syndrome, which often results from damage to right inferior 
parietal cortex, produces an inability to consciously perceive contralesional sensory 
stimuli (Mesulam, 1999). Because hemispatial neglect cannot be explained by assuming 
damaged low-level sensory processors, it is often described as an “attentional” deficit 
(Mesulam, 1999). This shows that cortical areas that do not directly and solely analyze 







When cortical activity elicited by consciously seen versus unseen is compared, 
increased activation is typically observed in visual cortical areas, especially in the 
ventral visual cortex (Logothetis, 1998; Tong, et al., 1998). Many studies have also 
reported increased activity in parietal and frontal cortices (Beck, et al., 2001; Kouider, et 
al., 2007; Panagiotaropoulos et al., 2012). Although this is in concert with the fact that 
lesions to extrasensory areas may produce deficits in conscious perception (e.g. 
Mesulam, 1999), the exact role of these areas is not understood. These areas might 
directly contribute to conscious perception, but they might also reflect factors such as 
attention, or decision making, that is, reflective consciousness. This question is 
significant because some theories assume that frontoparietal activity is necessary for 
conscious perception (Dehaene, et al., 2006) whereas others do not (Lamme, 2010).  
 
1.2.2. Theories about neural mechanisms of visual consciousness 
Neural processing of stimulus information can be categorized as feedforward or 
feedback, depending on whether it consists of bottom-up flow of sensory information, 
or whether it reflects modulation from other, higher cortical areas (in the processing 
hierarchy), respectively (Bullier, 2001; Rockland, 2003). Feedback connections are 
sometimes divided to “local” and “global” (e.g. Lamme, 2004). Although this distinction 
is somewhat vague and descriptive, in the present thesis, “local feedback” activation 
means feedback signals from higher visual cortical areas to lower visual cortical areas 
(e.g. from V4 to V1). “Global feedback” refers to modulatory activity between different 







sensory signals, feedback connections can also convey top-down “attentional” 
modulation to lower cortical areas (Klimesch, 2011). 
The response of a single neuron can also be classified as feedforward or feedback. The 
feedforward response of a neuron can further be subdivided into specific components. 
For example, the first feedforward response of a neuron is typically a transient burst of 
action potentials, which is followed by a phase of more sustained firing (Macknik & 
Martinez-Conde, 1998).  
Perhaps the simplest hypothesis is that a sufficiently strong feedforward activation of 
certain visual areas is sufficient for conscious perception (Zeki & Bartels, 1999; Macknik 
& Martinez-Conde, 1998). A somewhat modified view assumes that feedforward 
activation that reaches the highest visual cortical areas also enables rough conscious 
vision (Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002). Some researchers have pinpointed the specific parts 
of a neural feedforward response that correlates with conscious visual perception 
(Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 1998; Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006).  
In contrast to the feedforward accounts, other models propose that interaction between 
cortical areas via feedback connections is a crucial component of conscious vision 
(Pollen, 1999; Dehaene, et al., 2006; Lamme, 2010). Lamme and colleagues have 
proposed that feedforward activation remains outside consciousness, although it might 
be sufficient for unconscious vision (Lamme, 2010). According to the theory, visual 
phenomenal consciousness is enabled by local recurrent activity within the ventral visual 
areas. Reflective consciousness emerges as the recurrent activations connect frontal and 







Some researchers maintain that consciousness requires the recruitment and 
communication of cortical areas outside sensory areas (Dehaene, et al., 2006; Baars, 
2002; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011). The global workspace theory denies the existence of pure 
phenomenal consciousness, and presupposes that conscious perception is always 
coupled with cognitive access of the contents of visual perception (Dehaene, et al., 2006; 
Baars, 2002). The argument for this view is that consciousness serves an important 
function: it enables flexible voluntary behavior (in contrast to the rigid and automatic 
unconscious perception). The global workspace theory thus assumes that recurrent 
activation within the visual system remains outside of consciousness (“preconscious”, to 
use their term). In order to become conscious, the preconscious visual information must 
be selected into the global cortical activity network, consisting of frontal and parietal 
cortices (the “global workspace”), by selective attention.  
Other theories have proposed that attention and consciousness are more independent, 
although intertwined. Hochstein and Ahissar (2002) proposed that conscious 
perception of the gist of a scene can be accomplished by the feedforward activation of 
the highest levels of the hierarchical visual areas, that is, without focused attention. 
However, conscious perception of details requires feedback activation of the early 
visual areas (this corresponds to focused attention) which have the smallest receptive 
fields, and are thus capable of processing small details. 
In general, different forms of attention are often assumed to rely on modulatory, 
feedback activity from certain brain areas to other areas (e.g. Olson, et al., 2001). 







attention and conscious vision, the nature of these interactions is inherently different. 
According to Lamme (2003), attention can be described as the modulatory state that 
influences conscious processing. Attention may pre-activate neural networks or bias 
neural activation, thereby influencing what contents enter consciousness, but local 
recurrent activation in the ventral visual stream underlies phenomenal conscious 
perception. 
 
1.3. Methods for suppressing visual consciousness 
1.3.1. Metacontrast masking  
Metacontrast masking is a form of backward masking where a spatially adjacent non-
overlapping mask stimulus may reduce the visibility of a preceding stimulus. A similar 
version of masking where the mask precedes the target stimulus is called paracontrast. 
Metacontrast masking has been extensively studied in vision science in healthy and 
selected subject populations, and it is a commonly used method to manipulate visual 
consciousness (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006). When target and mask stimuli have equal 
energies (duration, size and contrast), metacontrast typically leads to a characteristic u-
shaped masking function (also called type B masking functions), shown in Figure 1A: 
the mask maximally suppresses the visibility of the target stimulus when the mask is 
presented a few tens of milliseconds after the onset of the target stimulus. The masking 
function of paracontrast is also often u-shaped, although paracontrast typically induces 







While a number of theories have been proposed to explain the metacontrast effect, 
recent explanations can be roughly divided into two categories, depending on whether 
metacontrast is assumed to inhibit feedforward (Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 1998) or 
feedback processes (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 1. A) Typical para- and metacontrast masking functions. When SOA is 0 ms 
(dashed line), the target and mask stimuli are presented simultaneously. Positive SOAs 
correspond to metacontrast masking, i.e., the mask is presented after the target. B) A 
“classical” suppressive effect of TMS to occipital pole is observed when pulses are 
applied ~100 ms after the visual stimulus onset. 
 
 
1.3.2. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
The weakness of classical brain imaging methods is that they can only reveal what 
neural processes correlate with a given cognitive process, but they do not allow 
researchers to make conclusive causal inferences. For example, the study of NCC cannot 
be assumed to reveal only those neural processes that directly underlie, or “cause” 







is that it allows researchers to probe the causal relevance of specific cortical areas to 
given cognitive tasks.  
In TMS, magnetic pulses are used to induce an electric (E) field in cortical tissue (Walsh 
& Pascual-Leone, 2003). Using a focal coil the maximal magnetic field can be focused 
with high spatial precision. This means that in optimal circumstances, TMS pulses may 
be used to target single visual areas (Salminen-Vaparanta, et al., 2012). In practice, 
however, the induced electric field cannot be limited to any specific areas, but it decays 
gradually with distance from the center of stimulation (Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003).  
TMS can be assumed to typically affect different types of neurons (e.g. excitatory and 
inhibitory) within a stimulated area (Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003). Behaviorally, TMS 
may have inhibitory or facilitatory effects. In the present studies, we were especially 
interested in how TMS can be used to interfere with visual perception (see Fig. 1B). We 
used a single-pulse TMS approach where single TMS pulses are applied to a selected 
cortical area while a participant is performing a perceptual task. The causal 
contribution of a specific cortical area at specific time-points can be studied by varying 
the timing when a TMS pulse is applied relative to the task a participant is performing.  
 
1.3.3. Event-related potentials (ERPs) 
ERP is a method of averaging sequences of electroencephalogram (EEG; measurement 
of the brain’s electrical activity) that are time-locked to some event, usually the 
presentation of a stimulus. The ERP thus represents the brain’s average response to 







leaving only the neural signal that is time-locked to the specific event (Luck, 2005). 
However, phase-locked neural oscillations may also contribute to the ERPs (Makeig, et 
al., 2002).  
Although ERP’s have a relatively low spatial resolution (e.g. compared to TMS or fMRI), 
they have very high temporal resolution. Hence, by comparing ERPs produced by 
stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not, one can estimate when, 
and roughly in which parts of the brain, the processes that correlate with visual 
awareness take place.  
 
 
Figure 2. A typical visual ERP waveform. Notice that negativity is plotted upwards, and that 
positive or negative ERP peaks are labeled according their order. The figure also depicts the 
three proposed correlates of consciousness: an enhanced P1 wave, VAN (negative difference 
between amplitudes), and the LP (positive difference). Dashed line represents stimuli that were 
consciously perceived, while the solid line those stimuli the participants did not consciously see. 
(from Study III) 
 
An ERP waveform consists of a sequence of positive and negative voltage deflections 
(see Fig 2).  The deflections are labeled with respect to their polarity and order (P1, N1, 
P2 etc.). Importantly, the deflections of an ERP waveform are the sum of many “latent 
components” (Luck, 2005). Thus, different latent components, each reflecting a specific 
 
 




neural generator, contribute to the shape and timing of visible ERP waves, meaning that 
single deflections typically cannot be associated with any sole neural or cognitive 
process. Nevertheless, the early parts of a visual ERP (e.g. P1) reflect more low-level 
visual processes, whereas later components (e.g. P3) are more related to higher 
cognitive processes. 
 
2. Aims of the studies 
The general aim of the present thesis was twofold. First, to investigate the ERP 
correlates of conscious vision. How is visual consciousness reflected in ERPs during 
metacontrast masking? More generally, what is the empirical support for different 
proposed ERP correlates of visual consciousness? The second aim was to study 
suppression of visual consciousness by TMS and metacontrast masking. Does TMS or 
metacontrast  suppression result from inhibition of feedforward (Thielscher, et al., 2010; 
Sack, et al., 2009), or feedback (Beckers & Zeki, 1995; Corthout, et al., 1999) activity, or 
a combination of these (Koivisto, et al., 2011)? Do these methods disturb only conscious, 
or also unconscious perception?  
Below I will discuss the specific aims of each study in more detail.  
 
2.1. Studies I-III: ERP correlates of visual consciousness 
In Study I we examined the ERP correlates of metacontrast masking. Classical ERP 
studies of metacontrast masking, which showed that metacontrast influences 
 
 




“intermediate” ERP components (roughly 200 ms after target onset), were completed 
over twenty years ago (e.g. Andreassi, et al., 1976; Bridgeman, 1988). The conclusions of 
these studies have been challenged by van Aalderen-Smeets et al. (2006) who argued 
that metacontrast modulates, not intermediate, but later, “post-perceptual” processes 
(specifically, the P3 component). In their MEG study, Van Aalderen-Smeets et al. (2006) 
compared metacontrast masking to a similar “pseudomaking” condition, that didn’t 
induce masking. This allowed the examination of the metacontrast effect while 
minimizing confounds that are due to summation of the ERPs produced by the target 
and mask stimuli. Although this is an important methodological improvement compared 
to prior metacontrast ERP studies, the study by van Aalderen-Smeets et al. (2006) 
lacked empirical and statistical examination of the control (pseudomask) condition. We 
used a similar pseudomasking condition as van Aalderen-Smeets et al. (2006), but also 
statistically examined the pseudomask condition.  
Study II is a reply to a commentary by Bachmann (2009)  on the above presented Study 
I.  
Study III is a review of ERP studies of visual consciousness. Different ERP deflections 
have been suggested as the correlates of consciousness. Major differences in the timing 
and scalp topography of these components reflect major differences in the models of 
consciousness they support. Our aim in reviewing the evidence for the proposed 
correlates was to examine which of the proposed correlates gains strongest empirical 








2.2. Study IV: Mechanisms of visual suppression in TMS and 
metacontrast masking  
Metacontrast masking is assumed to leave the earliest feedforward signals intact, 
although views differ as to exactly what later visual processes metacontrast masking is 
assumed to suppress (later feedforward signals, Macknik & Martinez-Conde, 1998; or 
feedback signals, Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006). The sparing of the earliest feedforward 
signals could explain the availability of unconscious visual information despite 
metacontrast masking (Vorberg, et al., 2003; Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006).  
Unlike metacontrast, paracontrast masking, which is the forward masking version of 
metacontrast, has been suggested to inhibit the target-related feedforward neural 
response (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Ögmen, et al., 2003). Hence, it should suppress 
not only conscious visual perception but also unconscious processing (Breitmeyer & 
Ögmen, 2006). Nevertheless, paracontrast masking is relatively little studied, compared 
to metacontrast masking. 
Adjusting the delay at which occipital TMS is delivered after visual stimulation 
influences which part of the visual-response the TMS pulses affect. The typical finding 
after occipital stimulation is the classical suppressive effect (the “dip”) centered around 
100 ms (Fig. 1B). The dip begins after 60 ms (Amassian, et al., 1989; Beckers & Zeki, 
1995), and depending on the study, has been observed to continue up to 200 ms after 
visual stimulus onset (Corthout, et al., 1999). Some studies have also reported 
additional time-periods, before and after the classical dip, where occipital TMS can 
disturb visual perception (Corthout, et al., 1999; Camprodon, et al., 2010). 
 
 




In study IV we directly compared visual suppression by metacontrast, paracontrast and 
TMS. The aims were to examine, first, if the suppressive time windows observed in TMS 
studies are comparable to those observed in paracontrast and metacontrast, as 
suggested by Breitmeyer, Ro and Öğmen (2004). Second, our study included a forced-
choice location detection task, in addition to reports about the conscious visibility of a 
stimulus. This allowed us to examine whether the participants could guess the location 
of a stimulus rendered invisible by TMS, metacontrast or paracontrast, and thus directly 
test the predictions of different models of visual suppression and unconscious visual 
processing. 
2.3. Study V: Unconscious and conscious processing of chromatic 
information in the early visual cortex 
Unconscious information can be studied by using subliminal priming, where stimuli that 
remain unconscious (i.e. subliminal) influence responses to subsequent target stimuli 
(Jacobs & Sack, 2012; Vorberg, et al., 2003). Metacontrast masked stimuli can produce 
unconscious priming when participants respond to the color of the mask (Schmidt, 
2000), and psychophysical evidence suggests that V1 is crucial for this unconscious 
priming by color (Breitmeyer, Ro, & Singhal, 2004). However, in concert with studies on 
blindsight patients (Stoerig & Cowey, 1992), a TMS study by Boyer et al. (2005) showed 
that the early visual cortex might not be essential for unconscious processing of color. 
The authors suggested that geniculate projections that bypass V1 can mediate 
unconscious processing of chromatic information. 
 
 




In study V we examined if the early visual cortex contributes to unconscious processing 
of chromatic information by measuring unconscious forced-choice color recognition 
and unconscious, metacontrast masked priming by color. We also studied how occipital 
TMS affects conscious color recognition. If the processing of chromatic information 
relies on the geniculostriate projection, both conscious and unconscious perception of 
color should be disturbed (assuming the TMS pulses suppress feedforward visual 
activation of early visual cortex). 
 
3. Methods and results 
3.1. Study I: An ERP-study of metacontrast masking 
ERP’s elicited by metacontrast masked targets were compared to pseudomasked at 
three different SOAs (0, 50, and 130 ms) (Fig. 3A). The participants’ (N = 14) task was to 
recognize the shape of the target and rate how visible the target was.  
As expected from previous studies (van Aalderen-Smeets, et al., 2006), only 
metacontrast masking (and not pseudomasking) produced a significant reduction in 
target visibility (and recognition performance) during the middle SOA (50 ms) (Fig. 3B).  
Metacontrast masking (when compared to pseudomasking) was reflected in ERPs at 
two time-windows (Fig. 3C). First, consciously perceived, pseudomasked, stimuli 
produced more negative amplitudes 300 ms after stimulus onset in occipito-temporal 
sites than metacontrast masked stimuli. A similar negative amplitude difference 
revealed by the comparison of ERPs to consciously perceived and unperceived stimuli 
 
 




in several previous studies, has been called visual awareness negativity (VAN) (Ojanen, 
et al., 2003; Wilenius-Emet, et al., 2004; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010). Second, like many 
previous ERP studies of visual consciousness (Sergent, et al., 2004; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2010), VAN was followed by a more centrally localized positive difference in the ERPs, 
beginning around 450 ms (late positivity, LP): consciously perceived stimuli produced 
more positive amplitudes than stimuli that were not consciously perceived. The timing 
and scalp topography of LP corresponds to the P3 wave (Del Cul, et al., 2007). Our 
results show that although metacontrast masking is reflected in the late positive ERP 
component as van Aalderen-Smeets et al. (2006) suggested, an earlier correlate is VAN. 
Another important issue is that by examining the ERPs of trials where only the masks 
were presented, we were able to show the differences between metacontrast masking 
and pseudomasking were probably not due to different ERP responses to the masks per 
se (i.e. to physically different stimuli). 
Our results are in good agreement with the “classical” ERP studies of metacontrast (e.g. 
Andreassi, et al., 1976; Bridgeman, 1988). These classical studies compared masking 
conditions that differed with respect to stimulus presentation timing (thus confounding 









Figure 3. A) A schematic presentation of the visual sequence presented on each trial. 
The mask on left is the metacontrast mask while the mask on right is the less effective 
“pseudomask”. B) Behavioral results show that metacontrast masking (solid line) 
reduces target visibility more than the pseudomask during the 50 ms SOA. At the two 
other SOAs the two mask types have similar masking strengths. Error bars represent 
the standard error of mean. C) ERPs from the temporal electrodes show VAN and LP 









3.2. Study II: Response to Bachmann’s (2009) comments on Study I 
Study II is a reply to Bachmann’s (2009) commentary on our metacontrast ERP study. 
Bachmann’s main concern is that our ERP result might have been, not due to differences 
in the subjective perception of the target stimulus, but due to small differences in 
physical stimulation between the conditions. Respectively, Bachmann further argues 
that studies of the NCC should always compare two physically identical conditions. 
While the issues Bachmann raises are important, a number of issues speak against his 
interpretations. First, although the metacontrast and pseudomask conditions did differ 
physically in our study, we also included a control condition (masks presented alone, 
without the target stimuli) to statistically examine this confound. Second, our approach 
was clearly hypothesis-driven: based on extensive research (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 
2010), we were expecting the VAN–late positivity combination. Third, the biggest 
difference caused by the physical difference between the metacontrast and the 
pseudomask is arguably their different masking strengths, which was the object of our 
study, and verified by behavioral results. The differences between the mask types may 
also have other, smaller effects on the ERPs, but these differences can be assumed to be 
minor compared to the differences in masking strength. Fourth, we do not completely 
agree with Bachmann in that invariant experimental conditions are always superior 
when studying the NCC, as invariant conditions are also subject to confounds (e.g. 
differences in attention levels may explain differences in conscious perception). 
 
 




3.3. Study III: Review of ERP correlates of consciousness 
VAN and the late positive deflection (LP) are the two ERP correlates of consciousness 
that have been most frequently observed in studies. In addition, some studies have 
reported an earlier correlate of consciousness, an enhanced P1 component (see Fig. 1) 
(Pins & ffytche, 2003). We reviewed the literature supporting these three proposed 
correlates of consciousness, each of which offers a quite different view to the 
mechanisms behind conscious vision. A central theme in our review was the interaction 
between attention and the processes that underlie consciousness. 
Although numerous studies have reported that the P1 correlates with consciousness, 
the studies fail to provide convincing evidence that P1 is a genuine correlate of 
consciousness. The problem, which is typically acknowledged in the studies, is that the 
proposed P1 correlate of consciousness could instead be a correlate of attention.  That is, 
the P1, which is known to be influenced by different types of attention mechanisms 
(Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Zhang & Luck, 2009), could be generated by early neural 
processes that co-vary with visual consciousness, but do not necessarily themselves 
directly “produce” visual consciousness. 
VAN, the second earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness, observed using a 
wide range of techniques (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010), also occurs in a time-window 
that is known to be modulated by attention. However, research has shown that VAN is 
at least partially independent of attention, and might thus reveal a direct correlate of 
conscious processing. The early part of VAN seems to emerge independently of top-
down feature-based attention (Koivisto, et al., 2006). The fact that top-down attention 
 
 




seems to interact with conscious perception and VAN only at later stages suggests that 
VAN reflects a set of different neural and cognitive processes that underlie the 
emergence of conscious vision. We also suggested that differences in the processing 
demands of visual stimuli might explain why the timing of VAN varies across studies. 
Strong stimuli that are easily resolved might reach consciousness faster than 
perceptually demanding stimuli that require extensive attentional processing. 
According to another interpretation, LP is the direct correlate of conscious processing 
(Sergent, et al., 2004; Del Cul, et al., 2007). The proponents of the LP thus claim that the 
processing reflected in VAN serves to make visual representations preconscious, that is, 
make them potential future contents of consciousness (Dehaene, et al., 2006). The 
motivation behind this argument comes (at least partly) from the theoretical view that 
conscious processing is associated with widespread distribution of information in the 
brain which enables conscious access of those contents. An alternative interpretation of 
the LP is that it is a marker of reflective consciousness, leaving VAN as the correlate of 
phenomenal visual consciousness (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010). 
In our review, we conclude that the interpretation of LP as a correlate of any type of 
consciousness may be false. Most problematic for the view that LP marks conscious 
processing are reports that have dissociated LP from consciousness: studies where LP is 
not observed in comparisons of unconscious and conscious conditions (although earlier 
correlates are observed; Koivisto, et al., 2006), or where similar late positive deflection 
(P3) is observed, even in the absence of conscious perception (Cavianto, et al., 2012).  
 
 




3.4. Study IV: Comparison of metacontrast masking and TMS 
Eleven participants took part in Study IV. The experimental procedure is depicted in 
Figure 4A. The participants were presented with small (.2°) target stimuli (a grey dot) 
for one screen refresh (at 60 Hz, i.e. ~17 ms). The target was presented either in left or 
right visual field, and the participant’s fist task (forced-choice) was to report on which 
side the target was presented. Secondly, the participant was asked to rate the visibility 
of the stimulus. On some experimental blocks the visibility of the target was 
manipulated by paracontrast or metacontrast masks, presented on both visual field 
locations (SOAs: -117–217 ms). In another experimental condition the visibility of the 
target was manipulated by occipital single-pulse TMS (no masks were presented). The 
TMS SOAs corresponded to the visual masking SOAs, assuming a 60 ms retinocortical 
transmission time (TMS SOAs: -42–275 ms).  TMS was applied to the early visual cortex 
in left or right hemisphere. 
Occipital TMS led to the expected results: Visibility of the target stimulus was 
suppressed in particular during SOAs near 100 ms (i.e. the “classical dip”). Also the 
analysis of metacontrast masking returned expected results: target visibility was 
reduced at intermediate SOAs, leading to the characteristic u-shaped masking profile. 
Comparison of the SOAs at which TMS and metacontrast masking maximally suppressed 
target visibility (by taking account 60 ms of retinocortical transmission time) revealed 
that maximal metacontrast masking occurred after maximal TMS suppression (Fig. 4B). 
This suggests, in concert with previous studies (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006; Macknik & 
Martinez-Conde, 1998), that metacontrast more strongly inhibited later target-related 
 
 




neural responses. Our conclusion rests on the assumed 60 ms retinocortical 
transmission time. This estimate of retinocortical transmission latency is based on 
intracranial recordings in humans (e.g. Wilson et al., 1983). Given that our targets were 
small, low-contrast dots, the 60 ms estimate of retinocortical transmission time is 
conservative: decreases in stimulus intensity are known to greatly increase the 
feedforward response latencies of neurons (Gawne et al., 1996). Assuming a longer 
retinocortical delay, in concert with the low-intensity of the stimuli, would yield 
stronger support for the view that metacontrast suppresses feedback activity.  
Although TMS clearly suppressed conscious visibility of the targets, target detection 
rates did not reveal a strong suppression. Analysis of the trials where subjects reported 
“not seeing the target at all”, showed that the detection of target location was 
nevertheless above 70% correct (Fig. 4C), which is statistically significantly above 
chance (i.e. 50%). The above chance unconscious performance could be explained by 
projection trough the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) or through superior colliculus 
that bypass V1. 
Similarly, if metacontrast masking leaves the initial feedforward responses uninhibited, 
it should also enable unconscious location detection (similar to TMS results). 
Conversely, does paracontrast masking, which has been suggested to inhibit the target’s 
transient onset-response, also block unconscious location detection? Our results on the 
trials where subjects reported “not seeing the target at all” confirmed this prediction: 
Statistically significant (above chance) unconscious location detection was possible 
during efficient metacontrast but not during paracontrast masking (Fig. 4C).  
 
 






Figure 4. A) The experimental procedure. B) Comparison of TMS and visual masking. 
Grey line represents para- and metacontrast. Black line shows TMS results (stimulated 
hemifield), when the retinocortical delay is taken into account (see Study IV for details). 
Note that maximal visual masking takes place after maximal TMS masking. C) Forced-
choice location detection accuracy in different experimental conditions during those 
trials where the participant reported not seeing the stimulus at all. Error bars represent 
the standard error of mean. (Study IV) 
 
3.5. Study V: Unconscious processing of chromatic information 
To investigate conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic information, we 
employed early visual cortex stimulation at three TMS SOAs (40, 70, and 100 ms after 
 
 




stimulus onset), in three different experimental conditions: 1) Conscious recognition of 
color, 2) unconscious, metacontrast masked color priming, and 3) forced-choice 
recognition of consciously invisible color (see Fig. 4 for details of the experimental 
procedure). Thirteen participants were tested.  
Figure 4. In the metacontrast masked priming the participants were asked to report the 
color of the mask annulus (red or blue). They were not informed that a heavily masked 
prime stimulus was presented before the mask (red or blue). A control condition 
verified that the participants were indeed unconscious of the prime. The experiment 
also included a conscious color recognition condition where the participants were asked 
to recognize the color of the prime disk without the mask. Stimulus durations and TMS 
SOAs are presented on the horizontal bar. TMS was applied to right early visual cortex, 
so the processing of primes/targets presented in the lower left visual field (i.e. right 
hemisphere) were directly interfered with TMS (ipsilateral targets are a control 
condition)(Study V) 
 
The results of the conscious color recognition condition revealed that early visual cortex 
stimulation 70 or 100 ms after stimulus onset interfered with conscious color visibility 
and color recognition performance. Also unconscious metacontrast masked chromatic 
priming was interfered at a similar SOA (relative to prime), suggesting that early visual 
cortex activation 70–100 ms after stimulus onset underlies both conscious and 







color recognition performance was also dependent on early visual cortex stimulation 
(all SOAs pooled together to maximize the number of trials). When the participants 
reported perceiving the stimulus faintly, without consciously seeing the color, color 
recognition performance was above chance-level. However, when only those trials were 
included in which the subjects reported being completely unconscious of the stimulus, 
recognition of color was at chance-level. This suggests that early visual cortex activation 
underlies not only conscious color recognition, but also unconscious color recognition 
in healthy participants. 
 
 
Figure 5. Line graph (right vertical 
axis) shows the TMS results of the 
conscious color recognition condition 
(left hemifield targets). Bars represent 
the magnitude of priming in the 
unconscious masked priming 
condition during different TMS SOAs. 
Note that TMS pulses decrease 
unconscious priming during the same 
time-windows as they suppress 
conscious vision. Error bars represent 
the standard error of mean. (Study V)
 
4. Discussion 
The main findings of the present thesis are the following: 
1) Although visual consciousness is reflected in the ERPs as early as ~100 ms after 
stimulus onset, later (~200 ms; VAN) differences in the occipito-temporal visual 







any ERP correlates of visual consciousness that emerge after VAN, such as LP, are 
signs of post-perceptual cognitive processing. 
2) The classical suppressive time-window (~100 ms after stimulus onset) of early 
visual cortex TMS reflects inhibition of preconscious processing. The early parts 
of this suppressive time-window (~60 ms) may correspond to feedforward 
activity, but later periods (i.e. ~100 ms) probably already include local feedback 
communication in the visual cortex.  
3) Unconscious detection of target location is possible when stimulus visibility is 
completely suppressed by TMS of early visual cortex. However, in a similar 
situation, TMS suppression of conscious vision also disturbs unconscious 
perception of chromatic information. 
4) Evidence from ERPs (Study I) and comparison of metacontrast masking to TMS-
induced suppression (Study IV) suggest that metacontrast masking suppresses 
the conscious visibility of a target by inhibiting target-related feedback activity.  
5) Stimuli that are unconscious due to metacontrast masking may influence 
behavior. The results of Study V support the view that unconscious processing of 
chromatic information in metacontrast masking relies on early visual cortex 








4.1. Tracking the time-course of conscious perception 
ERP investigations of the temporal evolution of conscious perception suggest that 
conscious vision is enabled following number of different cognitive and neural 
processing stages. Based on ERP evidence (Foxe, et al., 2008), and intracranial 
recordings (Wilson, et al., 1983), the initial activation of V1 after thalamic inputs takes 
place about 60 ms after stimulus onset, which coincides with the beginning of the 
“classical” dip in TMS studies. Hence, TMS pulses around this time-window can be 
assumed to co-occur with the initial feedforward activation of early visual cortex.  
Although TMS can suppress consciousness at this time-window, it cannot be said that 
TMS inhibited the NCC in particular, assuming that feedforward activation is insufficient 
for conscious perception. None of the ERP studies of visual consciousness have 
suggested that feedforward activation (reflected in the visual C1 component; Foxe, et al., 
2008) would be the NCC. Early visual cortex TMS can have a smaller disturbing effect on 
visual perception also during considerably later time-windows (~200 ms; Corthout, et 
al., 1999; Camprodon, et al., 2010).  
The second earliest visual ERP deflection is the P1, which has been suggested to be 
generated in extrastriate cortical areas (Di Russo, et al., 2003). If local cortical feedback 
connections activate rapidly (Hupe, et al., 2001), the P1 might already include sensory 
feedback signals from extrastriate areas to V1. For example, the TMS results of Pascual-
Leone and Walsh (2001) suggest that the (feedback) projections from the cortical 
“motion area” V5 to early visual cortex operate in approximately 20 ms, and that these 







Although the P1 has been proposed to be the ERP correlate of consciousness, our review 
suggests that P1 modulation in these studies is better explained by differences in 
attentional processing between the consciously perceived and unperceived conditions. 
The attentional mechanisms that take place in the P1 time-window may influence what 
information reaches consciousness, but the P1 cannot be assigned the label NCC. 
According to a theory proposed by Klimesch (2011), the P1 is generated by alpha 
oscillations that reflect top-down attentional inhibition from parietal areas. This way 
alpha oscillation could influence what stimuli enter consciousness, without being the 
direct correlate of conscious perception. On the other hand, other evidence suggests 
that the attentional modulation in the P1 time-window does not influence what 
becomes conscious (Wyart, et al., 2012). Both lines of evidence, however, agree that the 
attentional influences during P1 do not constitute a true NCC. 
We have argued that strongest evidence for the ERP correlate of phenomenal visual 
consciousness is for VAN, a negative amplitude difference typically onsetting before 200 
ms after stimulus onset and lasting up to 400 ms. The VAN localizes predominantly to 
the occipito-temporal cortex, which is in concert with other studies indicating 
involvement of the ventral visual stream in conscious perception (Milner & Goodale, 
2006; Logothetis, 1998; Tong, et al., 1998). VAN has also been demonstrated using MEG 
Liu et al., 2012), and intracranial recordings (Fisch, et al., 2009; Gaillard, et al., 2009).  
VAN seems to emerge independently of top-down feature-based attention, but attention 
later interacts with VAN, so that attended stimuli produce stronger VAN, compared to 







consciousness, it consists of different phases, the early part of it being independent, and 
later phase dependent of top-down attention. Evidence concerning spatial attention, 
however, suggests that under situations where subjects are attending solely to one 
location while completely ignoring the other location (where distracter stimuli are 
nevertheless presented), VAN is only observed in the attended locations (Koivisto, et al., 
2009).  
However, VAN has also been argued to be an ERP correlate of preconscious processes 
that bring perceptual contents to the verge of consciousness (Sergent, et al., 2004; Salti, 
et al., in press). According to this interpretation the LP is the ERP correlate of 
consciousness. However, this view does not explain why the early part of VAN has been 
shown to be independent of attention. That is, if VAN cannot be explained as an 
attention-related effect, what preconscious processes does VAN reflect? Furthermore, 
there is evidence that LP can be dissociated from consciousness (Koivisto, et al., 2006; 
Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008). Nevertheless, the question whether LP reflects 
consciousness or related cognitive processing, remains a central issue for future 
research. Furthermore, although VAN localizes to the ventral cortical areas, top-down 
modulation other cortical areas such as the parietal cortex, may be indispensable for 
consciousness (Mesulam, 1999). 
 
4.2. Unconscious and conscious perception 
Our results from metacontrast masking support the view that feedforward signals can 







unlike paracontrast, does not eliminate unconscious detection of stimulus location. 
However, Study V provided direct evidence that the early, possibly feedforward, activity 
of early visual cortex is important for metacontrast masked color priming. Importantly, 
similar color priming can be reduced by paracontrast masking (Breitmeyer, Öğmen, & 
Chen, 2004), again supporting the view that paracontrast suppresses feedforward 
activity that is crucial for unconscious and conscious perception. However, it should be 
noted that paracontrast is still a relatively little studied form of masking. This, and the 
fact that paracontrast masking can affect visibility during a wide-range of SOAs 
(suggesting of different suppression mechanisms), means that the conclusions about 
paracontrast should be taken cautiously. A potential confounding factor for interpreting 
visual masking results is also that the location of a target, for instance, might be inferred 
from the appearance of the mask (e.g. in our Study IV). That is, although the target 
remains invisible, it might influence the appearance of the mask (e.g. making the centre 
of the mask “blink”). 
Occipital TMS studies have demonstrated that visual stimuli that are not consciously 
perceived can nevertheless guide hand movements (Christiansen, et al., 2008; Ro, 2008). 
As only stimulus location needed to be processed in these studies to accomplish 
corrective movements, the results are similar to our reports of unconscious processing 
of target location (Study IV; see also Koivisto, et al., 2011). The ability to unconsciously 
resolve stimulus locations could be mediated by a visual pathway that bypasses the LGN 
(Christiansen, et al., 2008; Ro, 2008). An alternative possibility is the pathway through 
LGN to early visual cortex, as the TMS studies may have not been able to completely 







patients, however, evidence supports the conclusion that pathway bypassing the LGN 
mediate at least some blindsight abilities (Leh, et al., 2006; Tamietto, et al., 2008). 
Unconscious processes other than the processing stimulus location might rely on the 
early visual cortex. Study V suggests that unconscious processing of chromatic 
information relies on the early visual cortex in healthy participants. Early visual cortex 
may also be necessary for the processing of detailed spatial information. Koivisto et al. 
(2012) showed that unconscious, metacontrast masked symbolic priming depended on 
early visual cortex, suggesting that early visual cortex is necessary for unconscious 
processing of shape (see also, Koivisto, et al., 2011).  
Koivisto, Mäntylä and Silvanto (2010) have provided evidence that feedback is involved 
also in unconscious processing. The authors used motion stimuli and observed two 
time-periods during which TMS suppressed the conscious perception of motion. 
Following earlier studies (Silvanto, et al., 2005), these two periods were interpreted as 
markers of feedforward and feedback signals, because V5 stimulation suppressed 
conscious perception of motion at an intermediate SOA (with respect to early visual 
cortex stimulation). Next, Koivisto et al. (2010) examined forced-choice motion 
direction judgments during the trials when the participants reported not perceiving 
motion. Critically, accuracy was above chance-level when no TMS was applied, and 
during the early TMS time-window, but not during the second TMS time-window, which 
was assumed to correspond to the feedback activity. Hence, the results suggest that 
feedback activity (to V1) contributes not only to conscious, but also to unconscious 







is observed at intermediate (Pitts, et al., 2011), and late (Gaillard, et al., 2009) latencies, 
demonstrating that more than just feedforward activation is involved in unconscious 
processing.  
The argument that feedforward activation of visual areas is sufficient for unconscious 
perception is based on the premise that neurons’ receptive field properties and 
response selection can be engaged by simple activation of cortical areas. Although 
salient visual features (such as location) can be assumed to require mere feedforward 
activation, resolving more perceptually demanding stimuli might require feedback 
processing (e.g. Pitts et al., 2011). We have also suggested that this (unconscious) 
disambiguation and amplification of visual representations might explain why the 
emergence of NCC is sometimes delayed (Studies I and III).  
  
4.3. Conclusions and future directions  
During the last few years, the discussion concerning the NCC has concentrated on 
feedback activity, and there is strong evidence that feedback connections are involved 
in visual consciousness (Pascual-Leone & Walsh, 2001). Since feedback connections are 
a ubiquitous feature of the brain (Pollen, 1999; Gilbert & Sigman, 2007), a critical 
question is what separates consciousness-related feedback activity from unconscious 
feedback activity. According to Lamme’s theory, the crucial element of conscious 
processing is not mere feedback, but recurrent processing. This can be interpreted as 







(Lamme, 2010). However, a similar mechanism has been proposed to underlie neuronal 
communication in general (Fries, 2005), underlining the need for a more 
comprehensive view of the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness. A potential 
answer could be, for instance, the information integration theory of consciousness, 
which proposes an explanation why the information processed in certain recurrently 
communicating neural ensembles enters consciousness while others do not (Tononi, 
2004). Tononi (2004) proposes that a systems capacity to integrate information 
determines the system’s level of consciousness, whereas the contents of consciousness 
are provided by the specific relationships between the elements of the system.  
 A crucial next step in the study of ERP correlates of consciousness is to link the ERP 
correlates to their neural mechanisms. What exactly happens in visual cortex 
electrophysiology during VAN? How is VAN related to other features of neural 
activation (e.g. oscillations)? Although VAN localizes to the ventral visual sites, how do 
parietal or frontal cortices influence VAN and other electrophysiological correlates of 
visual consciousness? Finally, as discussed in Study III, it is critical that the relationship 
of the NCC and cognitive functions such as types of attention and decision making are 
further studied.  
TMS offers an excellent opportunity to investigate the contributions of not only lower 
but also higher levels of cortical areas to unconscious perception. A shortcoming for 
most TMS-induced blindsight studies (e.g. Studies IV and V) is that they concentrate 
merely on single TMS SOAs or pool a number of SOAs together (for practical reasons 







to directly test the hypothesis that feedback stages of visual processing are crucial for 
unconscious vision (but see, Koivisto, et al., 2010). Another problem for TMS studies is 
that due to small sample sizes they might lack statistical power to observe the small 
effect-sizes associated with unconscious processing (e.g. Study V). 
In conclusion, the results of this thesis support the view that conscious vision is enabled 
by a series of processing stages. The processes that most closely correlate with 
conscious vision take place in the ventral visual cortex (~200 ms after stimulus 
presentation, VAN), although preceding time-periods and contributions from other 
cortical areas such as the parietal cortex are also indispensable. Unconscious vision 
relies on intact early visual activation, although the location of visual stimulus may be 
unconsciously resolved even when activity in the early visual cortex is interfered with. 
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